Robustness and modular structure in networks by Bagrow, James P. et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Nov 08, 2017
Robustness and modular structure in networks
Bagrow, James P.; Jørgensen, Sune Lehmann; Ahn, Yong-Yeol
Published in:
Network Science
Link to article, DOI:
10.1017/nws.2015.21
Publication date:
2015
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Bagrow, J. P., Lehmann, S., & Ahn, Y-Y. (2015). Robustness and modular structure in networks. Network
Science , 3(04), 509-525. DOI: 10.1017/nws.2015.21
Robustness and modular structure in networks
James P. Bagrow
Mathematics & Statistics, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA and
Center for Complex Network Research, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
Sune Lehmann
DTU Informatics, Technical University of Denmark, Kgs Lyngby, Denmark and
College of Computer and Information Science, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
Yong-Yeol Ahn
School of Informatics & Computing, Indiana University, Bloomington IL, USA and
Center for Complex Network Research, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
(Dated: July 13, 2015)
Complex networks have recently attracted much interest due to their prevalence in nature and
our daily lives [1, 2]. A critical property of a network is its resilience to random breakdown and
failure [3–6], typically studied as a percolation problem [7–9] or by modeling cascading failures [10–
12]. Many complex systems, from power grids and the Internet to the brain and society [13–15], can
be modeled using modular networks comprised of small, densely connected groups of nodes [16, 17].
These modules often overlap, with network elements belonging to multiple modules [18, 19]. Yet
existing work on robustness has not considered the role of overlapping, modular structure. Here we
study the robustness of these systems to the failure of elements. We show analytically and empirically
that it is possible for the modules themselves to become uncoupled or non-overlapping well before
the network disintegrates. If overlapping modular organization plays a role in overall functionality,
networks may be far more vulnerable than predicted by conventional percolation theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a system of interacting elements representing computers, power generators, neurons, office work-
ers, etc. Typically these elements fulfill individual roles in the network such as regulating power or prop-
agating neuronal signals. Yet in many systems, global functionality may require elements to also perform
collective tasks of sufficient complexity that they cannot be completed by single elements. The elements
must instead work closely in teams, forming densely interconnected modules. These tasks may be paral-
lelised computations, protein biosynthesis, or higher-order neurological functions such as visual processing
or speech production.
Among various ways that modules can communicate or jointly function with each other, a prominent one
is sharing common elements across modules. Such overlapping elements may result from, e.g., pleiotropy
in the genome [20] or “structural folds” in social systems [21]. In biological networks, functional modules
often coordinate by sharing common elements. For instance, the recent yeast protein complex catalogue,
with high-quality hand-curated protein complex data, showed that a significant fraction of proteins belong
to multiple protein complexes [22]. In functional brain networks, overlap may indicate regions that integrate,
e.g., visual and auditory sensory cues [23], while in structural brain networks it was shown that “confluence
zones” that integrate information from other regions tend to participate in multiple modules [24]. In large
human organizations, liaison jobs—where workers coordinate cross-team activities by spending significant
time in multiple teams—are common [25]. For instance, many companies implement hierarchical management
systems, where a manager oversees several teams. In such cases, coordination between the teams are arranged
mainly by the manager who works with all the teams, playing the role of the overlapping element. Moreover,
collaboration and management across multiple locations frequently takes the form of swapping or dispatching
personnel across places. Another example is the systems analyst [26]. Systems analysts help organizations
improve their information technology offerings by liaising between end users or external vendors outside the
organization and the programming teams of the organization itself. Similarly, the militaries of many nations
have command structures dedicated to liaising between different military branches during joint operations,
including with the militaries of other countries [27].
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Inspired by these examples, we ask how these networks respond when a random fraction of elements fail:
can the modules become uncoupled (i.e., non-overlapping) before the network loses global connectivity?
Random failures provide a general model of, e.g., a traumatic brain injury or degenerative disease. If
enough elements fail, overlap may be lost and some or all modules may no longer be able to complete their
tasks (higher brain functions are lost) even though the network may remain connected (simpler autonomic
responses persist). Likewise, an individual module may fail if too many of its member elements cease to
function. These effects in combination may lead to a loss of modular overlap in the system, which by our
simplified assumptions causes impairment to the entire system. See Fig. 1 for an example illustrating how
the loss of a random element may cause a module to fail.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we study the robustness of an analytically tractable
model of modular networks (Secs. II A, II B), as well as additional models of modules (Sec. II C) and models
of how those modules may respond to random failures and targeted attacks (Sec. II D). Section III supports
these results with studies of four empirical network datasets covering very different research domains. Finally,
in Sec. IV we discuss the context of this work and how it may apply to the practical issue of missing data
during the detection of overlapping and non-overlapping communities in real-world network datasets.
II. MODELING MODULAR NETWORKS
Networks with overlapping modular structure can be well modeled with a bipartite graph, also known as
an affiliation network [28]. This network consists of two types of nodes representing the elements and the
modules and undirected links representing which elements belong to which modules. Links in the bipartite
graph only connect element nodes to module nodes. The network is characterized by two degree distributions,
rm and sn, governing the fraction of elements that belong to m modules and the fraction of modules that
contain n elements, respectively [29–32]. Links are placed randomly between element and module nodes
respecting these degree distributions [32]. The average number of modules per element is
∑
mmrm ≡ µ and
the average number of elements per module is
∑
n nsn ≡ ν. Using this as a starting point for our model, we
derive two networks from the bipartite graph by projecting onto either the elements or the modules: One
is the network between elements, studied by Newman [31] and Newman & Park [32], while the other is a
network where each node represents a module and two modules are linked if they share at least one element.
The Largest Connected Component (LCC) (also known as the giant component [7]) in the element network
disappears when, due to missing elements, the network loses global connectivity; in the module network it
vanishes if the modules become uncoupled (non-overlapping). Before projection elements fail independently
with probability 1 − p and are removed from the network. Meanwhile, a module is unable to complete its
collective task if fewer than a critical fraction fc of its original elements remain. These failed modules are
removed from the module network but any surviving member elements are not removed from the element
network (Fig. 1). This model of element and module failure serves as our starting point, but we will also
explore additional models.
Before we analyze this model, it is important to note that it makes two assumptions about the modular
nature of the system: that all interactions within each module exist and are equal, and that there are
no differences between individual elements that share a module—i.e., there are no “captains” or “team
leaders”. One may expect that these homogeneous (or “mean-field”) assumptions may limit the applicability
of results derived from this model. However, we argue that, when large numbers of modules are involved,
such microscopic, per-module details are less important to the macroscopic robustness of the large-scale
system than the overall organization of the network’s modules. That is, an averaged or mean-field model
for module failure captures the most essential elements of many systems’ robustness. Furthermore, we will
present a number of findings that relax these mean-field ingredients.
We wish to determine S(p), the fraction of remaining nodes within the LCC as a function of p, for both
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FIG. 1: Modeling failures in modular networks. We analyse two networks, one representing the linkages between
network elements (a) and a second detailing the overlapping connectivity between the modules themselves (b). In
this example, the failure of element 3 leads to the loss of module B, since B no longer has sufficient members to
complete its collective task. This causes the module network to become disconnected (bottom) even though the
element network remains connected.
the element and module networks. We use four generating functions [31, 32]:
f0(z) =
∞∑
m=0
rmz
m, f1(z) =
1
µ
∞∑
m=0
mrmz
m−1,
g0(z) =
∞∑
n=0
snz
n, g1(z) =
1
ν
∞∑
n=0
nsnz
n−1.
(1)
These functions generate the probabilities for (f0) a randomly chosen element to belong to m modules, (f1)
a random element within a randomly chosen module to belong to m other modules, (g0) a random module
to contain n elements, and (g1) a random module of a randomly chosen element to contain n other elements.
To analyse this model we now separately study the two projections (the element and module networks) of
the original bipartite graph.
A. Element network1
Consider a randomly chosen element A that belongs to a group of size n. Let P (k|n) be the probability
that A still belongs to a connected cluster of k nodes (including itself) in this group after failures occur:
P (k|n) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k. (2)
The generating function for the number of other elements connected to A within this group is
hn(z) =
n∑
k=1
P (k|n)zk−1 = (zp+ 1− p)n−1 . (3)
1 This short calculation was presented in Newman [31] and Newman & Park [32]. We repeat it here for completeness and to
introduce notation used for subsequent calculations.
3
Averaging over module size:
h(z) =
1
ν
∞∑
n=0
nsnhn(z) = g1(zp+ 1− p). (4)
The total number of elements that A is connected to, from all modules it belongs to, is then generated by
G0(z) = f0(h(z)). (5)
Likewise, the total number of elements that a randomly chosen neighbor of A is connected to is generated
by
G1(z) = f1(h(z)). (6)
Before determining S, we first identify the critical point pc where the giant component emerges. This
happens when the expected number of elements two steps away from a random element exceeds the number
one step away, or
∂zG0(G1(z))
∣∣
z=1
− ∂zG0(z)
∣∣
z=1
> 0. (7)
Substituting Eqs. (5) and (6) gives f ′0(1)h
′(1)[f ′1(1)h
′(1) − 1] > 0 or f ′1(1)h′(1) > 1. Finally, the condition
for a giant component to exist, since h′(1) = pg′1(1), is
pf ′1(1)g
′
1(1) > 1. (8)
For the uniform case, rm = δ(m,µ) and sn = δ(n, ν), this gives p(µ − 1)(ν − 1) > 1. If µ = 3 and ν = 3,
then the transition occurs at pc = 1/4.
To find S, consider the probability u for element A not to belong to the giant component. A is not
a member of the giant component only if all of A’s neighbors are also not members, so u satisfies the
self-consistency condition u = G1(u). The size of the giant component is then S = 1−G0(u).
B. Module network
Consider a random module C and then a random member element A. Let Q(`|m) be the probability that
C is connected to ` modules, including itself, through element A, who was originally connected to m modules
including C:
Q(`|m) =
(
m− 1
`− 1
)
q`−11 (1− q1)m−` , (9)
where
q1 =
1
ν
∞∑
n=0
nsn
n∑
i=x
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
pi−1(1− p)n−i. (10)
(Notice that q1 = 1 when x(n) ≡ dnfce = 1 for all n.) The generating function jm for the number of modules
that C is connected to, including itself, through A is
jm(z) =
m∑
`=1
Q(`|m)z`−1 = (zq1 + 1− q1)m−1 . (11)
Once again, averaging jm over memberships gives
j(z) =
1
µ
∞∑
m=0
mrmjm(z) = f1(zq1 + 1− q1). (12)
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FIG. 2: The size of the Largest Connected Component S for the element and module networks. Theory and
simulations confirm that the network undergoes a transition from coupled to non-overlapping modules well before it
loses global connectivity. Symbols represent element () and module ( ) networks. Here we used rm = δ(m,µ),
sn = δ(n, ν), with µ = 3 and ν = 6. Simulations used 10
6 elements.
The total number of modules that C is connected to is not generated by g0(j(z)) but by g˜0(j(z)), where the
g˜i are the generating functions for module size after elements fail:
g˜0(z) =
∞∑
n=0
s˜nz
n, g˜1(z) =
∑∞
n=0 ns˜nz
n−1∑∞
n=0 ns˜n
. (13)
The probability s˜k to have k member elements remaining in a module after percolation is given by
s˜k =
∑
n
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−ksn∑
n
∑n
k′=x
(
n
k′
)
pk′(1− p)n−k′sn
. (14)
The denominator is necessary for normalisation since we cannot observe modules with fewer than dnfce
members. Notice that s˜n = sn when sn = δ(n, ν) and dnfce = n = ν.
Finally, the total number of modules connected to C through any member elements is generated by F0(z) =
g˜0(j(z)) and the total number of modules connected to a random neighbor of C is generated by F1(z) =
g˜1(j(z)). As before, the module network has a giant component when ∂zF0(F1(z))|z=1 − ∂zF0(z)|z=1 > 0
and S = 1− F0(u) = 1− g˜0(j(u)), where u satisfies u = F1(u) = g˜1(j(u)).
For the uniform case with µ = 3, ν = 3, and fc > 2/3, the critical point for the module network is
pc = 1/2, a considerably higher threshold than for the element network (pc = 1/4). In Fig. 2 we show S for
µ = 3 and ν = 6. The robustness gap, the difference between the critical points for the element and module
networks, grows as the module failure cutoff increases, covering a significant range of p for the larger values
of fc.
Of particular interest are scale-free networks [2, 33]. Here we take rm = δ(m,µ) as before, but now
sn ∼ n−λ, with λ ≥ 2. (The degree distribution after projection remains scale-free, with the same exponent,
although the maximum degree may increase.) It is known that scale-free networks are robust to random
failures when 2 < λ < 3 (meaning that pc → 0). However, this result also requires that the maximum value
K of the degree distribution be large (K  1) [4]. Indeed, as we lower λ, we discover that, while we increase
the robustness of the elements, we actually decrease the robustness of the modules (Fig. 3). Interestingly,
increasing the maximum module size cutoff N = max{n | sn > 0} improves element robustness, but not
overall functional resilience.
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FIG. 3: Robustness of scale-free modular networks. Here rm = δ(m, 3), sn ∼ n−λ, fc = 1/2, and
N ≡ max{n | sn > 0}. Increasing N and decreasing λ, measures known to improve the robustness of scale-free
networks [4], actually magnifies the difference between the critical points. Surprisingly, this also increases the
fragility of the module network, indicating that optimizing against structural failure may worsen the network’s
functional resilience. Simulations used 105 elements.
C. Additional models of modules
Our analytic calculation (Secs. II A and II B) uses a basic, mean-field model of modular structure. Specif-
ically, we follow Newman and Park [32] and represent the element-element network as the projection of a
bipartite graph between elements and modules. This assumes that each module is fully dense, i.e. that all
interactions within the module are present and of equal strength (hence the mean-field nature). Due to
these assumptions, this network model is tractable, a great strength. Yet while we expect modules to be
unusually dense, it is unlikely that they will universally be completely dense. However, when considering
expected behavior over many modules, which is the primary factor of the model’s global network robustness,
we argue that such higher-order effects and potential microscopic details are subordinate to gross modular
features when studying global network connectivity.
Despite this, understanding how more detailed modular representations affect network robustness is im-
portant. As a first step we relax our assumption of mean-field intra-modular coupling. Before elements fail
(site percolation) we delete each link in the projected element-element network with a probability ρ (bond
percolation). When ρ = 0 we recover the original mean-field model where every module is completely dense.
For large values of ρ, such as ρ > 0.8 or 0.9, the modules possess no intrinsic density above that of the overall
density, and we recover a non-modular random graph. What this means is that we now model modules
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FIG. 4: Modules do not need to be completely dense. Here we study the scale-free modular networks of Fig. 3.
However, before element failures occur we first delete links inside modules such that the final density of each
module is approximately 1− ρ. When ρ = 0 we recover the results of Fig. 3. We consider two values of fc (top and
bottom) and two scale-free exponents λ (left and right). Closed symbols correspond to element networks, open
symbols to module networks. We see that in most cases the decreased density of modules has little effect. Only for
the more extreme values of ρ do we see a change, which is reasonable because high values of ρ effectively destroy the
modular nature of the network.
with approximately Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs. In this pre-percolation phase, an element fails if it loses all its
neighbors. Such elements are removed from the element-element network and they are counted as element
failures towards the modules.
We study the robustness of these networks in Fig. 4. We observe that ρ has little if any influence on
the relative robustnesses of the two networks, over a range of parameters. This provides further evidence
that our results do not pathologically depend on the mean-field nature (all-to-all coupling) of the underlying
model. We return to the importance of module density when we discuss our empirical results in Sec. III.
D. Additional models of module failures
We proposed a basic, mean-field model for how modules can fail. Instead of considering the microscopic
details of each module, we assumed that a module requires a critical fraction fc of its original member
elements to remain, regardless of which particular elements actually remain. This was done for the sake of
analytic tractability, yet there are numerous other models one can study, typically of greater complexity.
For example, certain modules may possess distinct critical structure in such a way that the module may
continue to function so long as one key element remains, regardless of how many other elements have failed.
But failure of that one element will invariably cause the module to fail.
As a first step towards exploring such alternative models of module robustness, consider the following.
Instead of requiring a critical fraction fc of elements for a module to function, we now consider a module to
remain if it has at least x > 0 elements remaining. This absolute number is now independent of the original
size of the module. We can study this analytically using nearly the same calculation presented in Sec. II B;
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FIG. 5: An alternative failure mode for modular networks. Here modules fail when they have fewer than x = 4
original member elements remaining. This absolute cutoff size differs from the relative cutoff model where a fraction
fc of the original member elements needed to remain for the module to remain functional. We see that, despite this
very different mechanism for module failure, the difference in critical points between the two networks remains,
supporting the generality of our results. (a) The size of the largest connected component for the element-element
and module-module networks for a scale-free distribution of module sizes with scale-free exponent λ = 3. We see
that the critical points remain different as we increase the maximum module size cutoff N . (b) As per panel a but
for a broader module size distribution (λ = 2.5). We see that increasing N can decrease the gap between the
element and module critical points. (c-d) The same networks as in panels a and b but now we plot the size of the
second largest connected component. This takes a maximum value at approximately the transition point pc and
may more clearly illustrate how the critical points change as N is varied.
we need only replace x(n) = dnfce with x = const. In Fig. 5 we study the robustness of the scale-free
modular networks considered in Fig. 3 under this new failure criterion. We see that, while the critical point
of the module-module network does vary, it remains different from the critical point of the corresponding
element-element network for most parameter values. The primary change being that increasing the maximum
module size does improve the robustness of the module network, when the scale-free exponent λ < 3.
In addition to random failure, seminal network studies also considered attacks where certain nodes—the
high-degree hubs—are more likely to fail. We again study the robustness of the scale-free network systems
in Fig. 3 but now elements fail with probability proportional to their degree in the element-element network.
We see in Fig. 6 that these attacks do shift the locations of both networks’ percolation critical points, as
expected. Yet, the module-module network remains less robust to attacks than the element-element network.
Thus our qualitative results remain for multiple failure methods, including targeted attacks.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We study failures in the following four biological and technological real-world datasets: A metabolic
network, a protein-protein interaction network, a network of web pages captured by a web crawler, and a
brain network captured from fMRI data The Metabolic and Protein-Protein Interaction (all) networks were
previously used in Ahn et al. (2010); details are available there. The World Wide Web network is constructed
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FIG. 6: Attacking modular networks. Here we consider the robustness of scale-free modular networks (compare to
Fig. 3) under intentional attacks where element failures are no longer uniformly random, but instead the probability
for an element to fail is proportional to the degree of the element in the original network such that higher degree
elements are more likely to fail than lower degree elements. We observe that, while smaller for attacks than random
failures, the difference between the percolation critical points of the two networks remains. Simulations used 104
elements.
from a web crawl made available by Google2. Finally, the Brain network was derived using normal subject
fMRI data where each node is a “voxel” dividing the brain spatially and links exist between voxels with
correlated time series. Full technical details can be found in Mørup et al. [34]. (We preprocessed the fMRI
network to remove spurious connections; see Appendix A for full details.)
Unlike the analytical models (Sec. II), here we do not know the modules in advance, so we estimate
them with an overlapping community detection algorithm [19]. This algorithm works by extracting link
communities at the level of maximum partition density [19], which were then converted to overlapping
node communities to provide the estimated modules. Only communities with at least three nodes were
considered [19]. These networks tend to be smaller than those previously discussed, introducing finite-size
effects that mask the behavior of S (Fig. 7). To overcome this, we additionally present S′, the fraction of
original nodes that remain in the largest connected component. This slightly different definition behaves
better for very small networks and high failure probabilities (small p) because the denominator does not
go to zero, but the transition at the critical point is not as dramatic, making it harder to find the critical
point. To more clearly demonstrate that the critical points of element and module networks in the empirical
data are not the same, we also calculate R21, the ratio of the size of the second largest to largest component
(R21(p) tends to peak at the critical point). As shown in Fig. 7, the modules fall apart more easily than the
elements, qualitatively matching our model across a broad range of networks.
In Sec. II C and Fig. 4 we discussed a model of modules that relaxed the need for them to be completely
dense, and showed that the robustness gap between the element network and module network remained.
That we do not require completely dense modules is further supported by the evidence presented here using
real-world networks and their community structure. These module networks are not created by projecting a
bipartite node-community graph. The modules themselves are not modeled but instead arise naturally from
a community detection method. These detection methods attempt to find dense graphs, but do not impose
structural restrictions. In Fig. 8 we present the distribution of module densities—defined as the fraction
of potential links within a module that actually exist—for all modules of each empirical network. We see
that most modules are dense, but not completely dense: most modules have about two-thirds link density,
corresponding to a value of ρ = 1/3 in our relaxed model. Since the empirical networks show qualitatively
similar relative robustness, this further supports the fact that our results depend on the presence of dense
modules but not on strict forms for those modules.
2 Google no longer hosts these data, but it remains available at http://snap.stanford.edu/data/web-Google.html.
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FIG. 7: Failures in a number of real, modular networks. Many of these networks are robust to random failures (the
element networks exhibit very small pc). The behavior of the largest connect component for all the empirical
networks qualitatively matches that of the model, as the identified modules uncouple faster than the network itself.
(top) Our original definition of S as the fraction of remaining nodes within the LCC tends to mask the transition for
very small networks, as seen by the upward turn at small p for some of the red curves. (bottom) We additionally
plot S′, the fraction of original nodes in the LCC. This leads to a less dramatic transition but also avoids the
denominator of S becoming very small. (insets) Finally, to clearly demonstrate the robustness gap between the two
networks, we also show the ratio R21 of the size of the second largest to largest component (fc = 0.7) as a function
of p, which tends to peak at pc, further illustrating the difference in critical points for the two networks.
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FIG. 8: Densities of empirically measured modules. For each of the four empirical datasets, we compute the
distribution of densities for subgraphs corresponding to the modules found using link communities [19]. The density
d is defined as the fraction of possible edges actually found within the module, i.e. m/
(
n
2
)
where m is the actual
number of links in the module and n is the number of nodes. We see that few modules are completely dense, except
for the world wide web network where approximately 40% of modules are fully dense. Instead most network
modules have densities between d = 0.2 and 2/3. This means that the empirical results shown in Fig. 7 do not
require fully dense, mean-field modules for lower modular robustness to be present, further supporting the
generality of our results.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have used an analytically tractable network model to study the robustness of modular networks to the
random failures of elements. By analyzing a second network detailing the connectivity between modules, we
have shown that the overlapping modular structure of the network is more susceptible to random failures
than expected. As mentioned previously, this modular network model makes mean-field assumptions about
both the nature of the modules and how element failures lead to module failures. To understand whether
these assumptions limit our results, we studied different models of modules within networks (Sec. II C) and
different types of module failure mechanisms (Sec. II D) including targeted attacks (Fig. 6). In all cases the
presence of modules within the network affects the robustness of the system.
There are a number of interesting avenues for further work. We considered the simplest case of random
failures but further analysis of purposeful attacks (where, e.g., elements with more connections are more likely
to fail) are also important. Likewise, the model we use assumes that all links exist within modules, but links
between modules are certainly possible. These additional “weak” links can only enhance the robustness of
the element network, but will not strengthen the module network, so that the network’s functional resilience
does not improve. Beyond structural characteristics of these modular networks it is important to understand
the effect of failures and modular structure on critical phenomena such as synchronization [35], contact
processes [36], cascades [10–12] or other dynamics [37].
Finally, this work may also help understand how analyses of empirical networks are affected by missing
data, of critical importance when finding communities, or empirically discovering modules [16]. Here p is
the probability that a network element is successfully captured by an experiment, such as a high-throughput
biological assay or web crawler, and the “failure” of a module is now the inability of a hypothetical or idealized
community detection method to discover it due to the module’s lack of density in the sampled network. In
this scenario, our results—the difference between the critical points of the element and module networks—
may indicate that, if the network is sampled down to the intermediate regime where nodes are connected
but modules are uncoupled, the community overlap in the network will be underestimated, allowing even
non-overlapping community methods to succeed. Of course, this is a simplified picture and requires further
investigation. We do not know the true community structure and the networks are likely to be already
missing data. Yet, since the existence of strongly overlapping community structure has been established in
many networks (e.g. Ahn et al., 2010) and as we have shown that sampling tends to reduce overlap between
modules, we argue that community overlap in real networks is likely to be underestimated.
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FIG. 9: Extracting the multiscale backbone and link communities of the fMRI brain network. We track the fraction
of nodes and links remaining in the network as a function of the backbone threshold α. Choose α too small and
little of the network remains; too big and the density is not altered. We see a small window near 0.35 < α < 0.4
where the number of links drops but the majority of nodes remain. We choose α = 0.37 (indicated) to exploit this.
(inset) Partition density [19] as a function of link dendrogram threshold for the extracted network. The vertical
line denotes the threshold at which the dendrogram was cut to determine link communities.
Appendix A: Brain network preprocessing
The Brain network was derived using normal subject fMRI data where each node is a “voxel” dividing
the brain spatially and links exist between voxels whose respective BOLD time series are correlated. We
begin with the top 200k most correlated links, measured using Mutual Information [34]. A single voxel had
very high degree, k = 0.73N (the next highest degree is k = 0.096N) so we first remove it. This leaves 5038
nodes and 196311 links.
We further preprocess this dense, weighted network by extracting its multiscale backbone [38]. To do so,
we use the Serrano algorithm [38] with local heterogeneity significance threshold α = 0.37. To determine
this value of α we use the following approach. The goal of the backbone extraction method is to prune
potentially spurious links by finding significant links while disconnecting few nodes from the network. If α
is too small many nodes will lose all their neighbors since few links will be significant. Yet if α is too high
few links will be pruned since most links will appear to be significant. Therefore we wish to choose α such
that the density of links is decreased but few nodes have been removed. In Fig. 9 we plot the fraction of
nodes and the fraction of links remaining in the graph as a function of α. Indeed we see a distinct window
0.35 < α < 0.39 where link removals occur but few nodes have been lost. We choose α = 0.37, a value in
the middle of this range where many links have been removed but nearly all nodes are still present in the
network.
After extracting significant links using the backbone algorithm, the fMRI data is reduced to a final network
of 5038 nodes and 77680 links. For the brain network (and all networks), link communities were extracted at
the link dendrogram level of maximum partition density [19], providing the estimated modules. As in Ahn,
et al. [19], only communities with at least three nodes were considered. In Fig. 9 (inset) we plot the partition
density of the Brain network as a function of the height (or threshold) of the link dendrogram (see Ahn, et
al. for details [19]). We see a sharp peak at a threshold near the root of the tree, giving a clear indicator for
the most modular component of the network’s link hierarchy.
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